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Abstract
This article examines the secrecy coding aided wireless communications from a source to a destina-
tion in the presence of an eavesdropper from a security-reliability tradeoff (SRT) perspective. Explicitly,
the security is quantified in terms of the intercept probability experienced at the eavesdropper, while
the outage probability encountered at the destination is used to measure the transmission reliability.
We characterize the SRT of conventional direct transmission from the source to the destination and
show that if the outage probability is increased, the intercept probability decreases, and vice versa. We
first demonstrate that the employment of relay nodes for assisting the source-destination transmissions is
capable of defending against eavesdropping, followed by quantifying the benefits of single-relay selection
(SRS) as well as of multi-relay selection (MRS) schemes. More specifically, in the SRS scheme, only
the single “best” relay is selected for forwarding the source signal to the destination, whereas the MRS
scheme allows multiple relays to participate in this process. It is illustrated that both the SRS and MRS
schemes achieve a better SRT than the conventional direct transmission, especially upon increasing the
number of relays. Numerical results also show that as expected, the MRS outperforms the SRS in terms
of its SRT. Additionally, we present some open challenges and future directions for the wireless relay
aided physical-layer security.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, physical-layer security (PLS) has attracted an increasing research attention [1]-[3],
since it was shown to achieve perfect resilience against eavesdropping attacks. The PLS work
was established by Wyner [4] for a discrete memoryless wiretap channel comprised of a source
and a destination in the presence of an eavesdropper. It was shown in [4] that simultaneous
secure and reliable transmissions can be achieved without using secret keys. In [5], Leung-
Yan-Cheong and Hellman examined the Gaussian wiretap channel and introduced the notion
of secrecy capacity, which is derived as the difference between the capacity of the main link
spanning from the source (S) to the destination (D) and that of the wiretap link spanning from S
to the eavesdropper (E). However, the secrecy capacity of wireless communications is severely
affected by the time-varying multipath fading [6]. For example, if the wiretap link has a relatively
good condition while the main link experiences shadow fading, the wireless secrecy capacity
would drop dramatically. More explicitly, assuming that the S-E link has a certain channel
capacity, but the S-D link is severely faded and hence has a low capacity, would increase the
probability of E intercepting the legitimate transmissions.
To this end, extensive research efforts have been devoted to enhancing the wireless secrecy
capacity in the face of multipath fading for example by invoking diverse multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) schemes [7], beamforming [8], [9] and cooperative relaying [10], [11]. In [7],
Goel and Negi considered the employment of MIMOs for generating a specifically-designed
artificial noise to confuse the eavesdropper. It was shown in [7] that the number of antennas
of the legitimate transmitter should be higher than that of the eavesdropper for the sake of
ensuring that the artificial noise only impacts the eavesdropper adversely without affecting the
legitimate receiver. Further beamforming techniques were studied in [8] and [9], which enable
the source to transmit its signal in a particular direction to the legitimate receiver, so that the
signal arriving at the eavesdropper encounters destructive interference and becomes much weaker
than that received at the legitimate receiver experiencing constructive interference, hence leading
to a significant secrecy capacity improvement. Additionally, in [10] and [11], we studied the use
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3of relays for guarding against eavesdropping and proposed the single “best” relay selection
technique for enhancing the wireless secrecy capacity.
The aforementioned contributions are mainly focused on improving the wireless security with-
out paying much attention to the communication reliability. To this end, in [12], we investigated
the security-reliability tradeoff (SRT) encountered in wireless communications without using
any secrecy coding, where the security is quantified in terms of the probability that E succeeds
in intercepting the source signal, while the reliability represents the probability that an outage
event is encountered at the legitimate destination. These probabilities are termed as the intercept
probability (IP) and outage probability (OP), respectively, where the OP can be reduced upon
increasing the transmit power of S, but at the same time this also enhances the S-E channel
capacity and increases the IP. It was shown mathematically in [12] that upon increasing the IP,
the OP is reduced and vice versa, which indicates a tradeoff between the security and reliability.
Furthermore, we proposed the single best-relay selection scheme in [12] for achieving a SRT
enhancement and showed that as the number of relays increases, the wireless SRT significantly
improves. It has to be pointed out that the SRT studied in [12] is based on the assumption that
no secrecy coding is used. However, in the recent literature on PLS [13], more and more secrecy
coding techniques have been devised.
As a consequence, this article investigates the SRT benefits of secrecy coding aided wireless
communications against eavesdropping attacks, differing from [12], where no secrecy coding
is considered for formulating and evaluating the wireless SRT. The main contributions of this
article are summarized as follows. First, we introduce a general channel model of secrecy coding
based wireless communications and characterize both the wireless security as well as reliability
in terms of the IP and OP, respectively. We will show that as the IP is increased i.e. the security
degrades, the OP (reliability) improves and vice versa. Secondly, we characterize the benefits
of both single-relay selection (SRS) and multi-relay selection (MRS) schemes in terms of their
ability to improve the wireless SRT. Specifically, the SRS scheme chooses the single “best” relay
for assisting the transmissions from S to D, whereas in the MRS approach, multiple relays are
selected to forward the source transmissions. Additionally, numerical results will be provided for
quantifying the advantage of the SRS and MRS over conventional direct transmission in terms
of their SRTs.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the system
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4model of a secrecy coding based wireless communication network consisting of a source and a
destination in the presence of an eavesdropper. The IP and OP are invoked for characterizing the
wireless security and reliability, respectively. Next, in Section III, we show the benefits of relay
nodes in terms of assisting the S-D transmissions and introduce both the SRS and MRS schemes
for the sake of guarding against eavesdropping, where numerical SRT results are also provided.
Section IV presents some challenging issues, which remain open at the time of writing. Finally,
we provide some concluding remarks in Section V.
II. SECURITY-RELIABILITY TRADEOFF FOR WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
In wireless networks, the broadcast nature of radio propagation makes the wireless trans-
mission extremely vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks, since it can be readily tapped by an
eavesdropper. As shown in Fig. 1, S transmits its signal to D, while E may overhear the
legitimate transmission, as long as it lies in the transmit coverage of S. Notice that only the
single eavesdropper is considered throughout this article and similar results can be obtained for
a multi-eavesdropper scenario. It is expected that increasing the number of eavesdroppers would
enhance the probability of successfully intercepting the source-destination transmission, resulting
in a performance degradation of the wireless security. In existing wireless systems, cryptographic
techniques are used for preventing E from intercepting the legitimate transmission between S
and D. Although the cryptographic methods do indeed improve the transmission security, this
comes at the expense of an increased computational complexity and latency. To be specific, a
cryptographic algorithm enhances the communication security, but unfortunately requires more
computational resources both for encryption as well as for decryption and increases the latency
[14]. Additionally, the encrypted information may still be decrypted by an eavesdropper, for
example by using an exhaustive key search known as ‘brute-force’ attack.
To this end, PLS emerges as a promising means of achieving information-theoretic security
for confidential communications in the face of eavesdropping. It has been proven in [2] that
perfect secrecy becomes possible, when the capacity of the main link spanning from S to D is
higher than that of the wiretap link spanning from S to E. Moreover, the capacity difference
between the main link and wiretap link was termed as the so-called secrecy capacity [5]. To be
specific, the secrecy capacity is the theoretic maximum rate at which S can transmit to D in
a near-error-free manner and at the same time, without leaking any confidential information to
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5E (i.e. achieving the zero mutual information between S and E). The goal of a secrecy coding
algorithm is to make it possible for S and D communicating both reliably and securely.
Recently, an increasing attention has been devoted to the design of practical secrecy coding
algorithms (e.g., polar coding [13]) for achieving the information-theoretic secrecy capacity. Fig.
2 depicts a general channel model of secrecy coding based wireless communications, where S
intends to transmit its message denoted by w at a secrecy rate of Rs. As shown in Fig. 2,
the secret message w is first encoded by a secrecy encoder (e.g. polar coding), generating the
codeword x at an increased overall rate Ro. The rate increment Re = Ro   Rs represents extra
redundancy, which is the cost of providing protection against eavesdropping. Next, the codeword
x is transmitted at a power P to D over the main link, which encounters a fading coefficient
hm and an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) sample nm. Meanwhile, E also overhears the
transmission of S through the wiretap link, where a fading coefficient hw and an AWGN sample
nw are experienced. Throughout this article, the Rayleigh fading model is considered for both
the main and the wiretap links, thus jhmj2 and jhwj2 are exponentially distributed with respective
means of 2m and 
2
w. It is also assumed that the AWGN at both S and E has a zero mean and
a variance of N0.
According to the Shannon’s coding theorem, if the S-D channel capacity drops below the
transmission rate Ro (owing to the wireless fading), D fails to recover the source message x, hence
an outage event occurs. Thus, the OP experienced at D relying on the direct transmission P directout
can be obtained by calculating the probability of occurrence of an outage event. Additionally, as
shown in [15], if the capacity of the wiretap channel becomes higher than the rate increment of
Ro  Rs, perfect secrecy is no longer achievable, which is regarded as an event of successfully
intercepting the source message, called intercept event. Accordingly, the IP experienced at E with
the aid of direct transmission P directint is determined by computing the probability of occurrence
of an intercept event. Combining the OP and IP expressions, we arrive at (see [12] for more
information)
P directint = exp

 2
 RsN0   2 Rs2mP ln(1  P directout ) N0
2wP

; (1)
which characterizes the relationship between the IP and OP for the direct transmission scheme.
Fig. 3 shows the IP versus OP by plotting (1) for different secrecy rates Rs with the signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) P=N0 of 15 dB, 2m = 1, and 
2
w = 0:1. It is seen from Fig. 3 that for the
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6secrecy rates of Rs = 0:2 bit/s/Hz and 0:6 bit/s/Hz, the IP decreases, upon increasing the OP.
Again, this implies that the wireless security can be improved at the cost of a reliability degra-
dation and vice versa, explicitly demonstrating the SRT of wireless communications in presence
of eavesdropping attacks. One can also observe from Fig. 3 that given the maximum tolerable
OP, the IP increases, as the secrecy rate increases from Rs = 0:2 bit/s/Hz and 0:6 bit/s/Hz.
Conversely, given a target IP requirement, upon increasing the secrecy rate, the OP increases
accordingly, demonstrating the SRT degradation imposed when a higher secrecy rate is used in
wireless systems.
III. RELAY SELECTION FOR WIRELESS SRT IMPROVEMENT
In this section, we consider a wireless relay network, where multiple relay nodes (RNs) are
available for assisting the legitimate S-D transmission, as shown in Fig. 4. More specifically,
D is assumed to be beyond the coverage area of S, hence N RNs are used for assisting the
S-D transmission. Meanwhile, E is assumed to be capable of overhearing the transmissions of
both S and RNs, which is the worst-case scenario. For notational convenience, the set of N
RNs is denoted by R = fRiji = 1; 2;    ; Ng, where the decode-and-forward (DF) protocol is
employed by the RNs. Naturally, similar results can also be obtained for the amplify-and-forward
(AF) relaying protocol.
Similarly to the channel model of Fig. 2, S first generates its signal x at a secrecy rate Rs,
which is then transmitted after secrecy coding at an overall rate of Ro to the N relays. Next,
the RNs attempt to decode x based on the DF protocol. The specific set of RNs capable of
successfully decoding the source signal x is denoted by D, which is termed as the decoding
set. Given the N relays, there are 2N possible combinations for the decoding set D, hence the
sample space of D is expressed as 
 = f;;D1;D2;    ;Dn;    ;D2N 1g, where ; represents
the empty set and Dn represents the n-th non-empty subset of the N relays. If the decoding set
is empty (i.e. no RN succeeds in decoding x), then all the relays remain silent and D becomes
unable to decode the source signal in this case. If the decoding set D is not empty, we may
activate some relays within D for forwarding the source signal x to D. In what follows, we
consider a pair of relay selection approaches, namely the SRS and MRS techniques.
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In the SRS scheme, only a single RN is selected from the decoding set D to assist the S-D
transmission. Since E is typically passive and remains silent in wireless networks, in practice
it is challenging to estimate the eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI). Motivated by
this observation, we assume that only the CSI of the S-D link is used for performing the relay
selection, whilst the eavesdropper’s CSI knowledge is unavailable. Hence, the specific RN that
maximizes the legitimate transmission capacity is typically considered as the “best” relay for
forwarding the source message. Accordingly, the best SRS criterion is formulated as
Best Relay = argmax
i2Dn
jhidj2; (2)
where hid represents the fading coefficient of the channel spanning from the RN Ri to D. It can
be observed from the SRS criterion of (2) that only the main channel’s CSI is required without
the wiretap channel’s CSI knowledge. Using the above relay selection, the capacity of the main
channel spanning from the “best” relay to D denoted by Csinglebd can be easily determined, where
the subscript ‘b’ stands for the “best” relay. As discussed above, when D fails to decode the
source signal, an outage event is encountered at D. Therefore, using the law of total probability
[9], we can obtain the OP of the SRS scheme by calculating the probability that Csinglebd is less
than Ro.
When the “best” relay forwards the source signal to D, it can be overheard by E, as shown in
Fig. 4. Meanwhile, E is assumed to be within the source node’s transmit coverage, thus it can also
overhear the direct transmission from S. Hence, E can combine its signals received from both
S and the “best” relay to obtain an enhanced signal version using selective diversity combining
(SDC), equal gain combining (EGC), or maximum ratio combining (MRC). Typically, MRC is
capable of achieving a better combining performance than the SDC and EGC. We thus consider
the employment of MRC at E for the sake of maximizing its capability of interpreting the source
message. Additionally, given the case of D = ; (i.e. no RN succeeds in decoding the source
message), all relays remain silent and thus E can only overhear the direct transmission from S.
As mentioned, when the eavesdropper’s channel capacity becomes higher than the rate increment
of Re, perfect secrecy can no longer be achieved and a so-called intercept event occurs. Hence,
the IP of the SRS scheme can be readily determined by comparing the eavesdropper’s channel
capacity and Re [15].
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8B. MRS Scheme
In contrast to the SRS, the MRS scheme allows multiple relays to simultaneously forward the
source signal to D. To be specific, if the decoding set D is non-empty (i.e. D = Dn), all the relays
in the decoding set of Dn may be activated for forwarding the source signal to D. This is different
from the SRS scheme, where only the single “best” relay is selected from the decoding set to
assist the S-D transmission. In the MRS scheme, a weight vector w = [w1; w2;    ; wjDnj]T is
defined for activating the RNs that succeeded in decoding the source signal, where ()T represents
the transpose operation and jDnj represents the cardinality of the decoding set Dn. Moreover,
the total transmit power of all relays should be constrained to unity in order to make a fair
comparison in terms of power consumption, hence the Euclidean norm of weight vector w is
constrained to be one. In the case of D = Dn, all relays in the decoding set Dn are activated
for simultaneously transmitting the source signal with the aid of the weight vector. We consider
that w is optimized for maximizing the received SNR at D, yielding
max
w
jwTHdj2P=N0; (3)
under the condition that the Euclidean norm of weight vector w is constrained to be one, where
Hd = [h1d; h2d;    ; hjDnjd]T represents the vector of fading coefficients for the channels spanning
from all relays in Dn to D. According to the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, an optimal weight
vector wopt can be readily obtained from (3) as wopt = Hd=jHdj, which shows that the weight
vector optimization only requires the main channel’s CSI without the need of the eavesdropper’s
CSI knowledge. Using the optimal vector and the Shannon capacity formula, we can readily
obtain the channel capacity achieved at D, which is then substituted into the outage definition
for determining the OP of the MRS scheme.
Due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation, E would overhear the transmissions of all
relays in Dn. Meanwhile, E can also overhear the direct transmission from S, as shown in Fig.
4. Here, the MRC method is considered for E to combine its received signals from both the S
and relays. After that, we can obtain an enhanced SNR at E and then determine the channel
capacity achieved at E. Finally, the IP experienced at E relying on the MRS scheme can be
obtained by calculating the probability that the eavesdropper’s channel capacity becomes higher
than the rate increment Re.
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9C. Numerical Comparison
In this subsection, we present numerical SRT results for the conventional direct transmission
as well as the SRS and MRS schemes. In this article, the wireless amplitudes (i.e., jhsdj, jhsij,
jhidj, jhsej and jhiej) are modeled by the Rayleigh fading, which in turn, leads to the fact that the
squared magnitudes jhsdj2, jhsij2, jhidj2, jhsej2 and jhiej2 are exponentially distributed random
variables with their respective means denoted by 2sd, 
2
si, 
2
id, 
2
se, and 
2
ie. In the numerical
SRT evaluation, the fading amplitudes are first generated by using the exponential distribution
having different means for different wireless channels, which are then substituted into the specific
definition of an outage (or intercept) event for determining the OP (or IP). In our computer
simulations, the means of the squared fading magnitudes are set to 2sd = 1, 
2
si = 
2
id = 2, and
2se = 
2
ie = 0:2. It needs to be pointed out that although only the Rayleigh fading is considered
in this article for the numerical SRT evaluation, similar SRT results can be obtained for other
fading models e.g. Nakagami and Rice fading. Additionally, an SNR of 15 dB is used in the
numerical SRT evaluations.
Fig. 5 shows the IP versus OP of the direct transmission (DT) as well as the SRS and MRS
schemes for different secrecy rates associated with N = 4, where N is the number of RNs. It can
be observed from Fig. 5 that for the cases of Rs = 0:2 bit/s/Hz and 0:6 bit/s/Hz, both the SRS
and MRS schemes outperform the conventional DT in terms of their SRTs. Moreover, the SRT
of MRS is better than that of SRS, explicitly showing the advantages of multi-relay selection
over single-relay selection. It is worth mentioning that the security benefit of the MRS over SRS
is achieved at the expense of a higher implementation complexity, since the MRS requires the
complex symbol-level synchronization among multiple spatially-distributed RNs, compared to
the SRS. Fig. 5 also illustrates that given a specific target OP, the IPs of the DT, SRS and MRS
schemes all increase, as the secrecy rate increases from Rs = 0:2 bit/s/Hz to 0:6 bit/s/Hz.
In Fig. 6, we characterize the IP versus OP of the DT as well as the SRS and MRS schemes
for different number of relays N . As shown in Fig. 6, the MRS scheme is the best and the
conventional DT performs the worst in terms of their SRTs, which further confirms the security
advantage of exploiting the multi-relay selection for guarding against eavesdropping. It is also
observed from Fig. 6 that as the number of relays N increases from N = 4 to 8, the SRTs of
both the SRS and MRS schemes improve significantly. This implies that increasing the number
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of relays is an effective means of enhancing the level of wireless physical-layer security against
eavesdropping attack.
IV. OPEN CHALLENGES AND FUTURE WORK
This section is mainly focused on the discussion of open issues in the PLS of wireless relay
networks. Although recently extensive efforts have been devoted to this research subject, many
challenging issues still remain open at the time of writing.
A. Wireless Security with Untrusted Relays
As discussed above, the IP of wireless communications relying on relay selection can be
significantly reduced upon increasing the number of relays. It has to be pointed out that in both
the SRS and MRS schemes, the relays are assumed to be trusted without any intention of tapping
the legitimate transmissions. However, this assumption may be invalid in some cases, where the
relays are compromised and become untrusted. Hence, it is of importance to explore whether an
untrusted relay is still beneficial or not in terms of enhancing the PLS. At the time of writing,
physical-layer network coding is considered to be an attractive design alternative for guarding
against an untrusted relay, where a pair of transceivers are allowed to transmit simultaneously so
that the relay only receives a composite superimposed or mixed signal. Although physical-layer
network coding improves the security level, an untrusted relay can still decode its composite
signal by using successive interference cancellation techniques. It is challenging, but interesting
to examine the benefits of relay selection in terms of improving the wireless PLS, while keeping
the legitimate transmission completely confidential to the relays.
B. Joint Multi-Relay and Multi-Jammer Selection
In wireless relay networks, a relay node can either be used to assist the source transmission for
improving the quality of the legitimate channel, or to act as a jammer for imposing artificial in-
terference on an eavesdropper for deliberately contaminating the wiretap channel. When multiple
RNs are available, some relays can be carefully selected for enhancing the throughput of the main
channel, while others may be used as jamming nodes for interfering with the eavesdropper. This
scenario is referred to as joint relay and jammer selection, which may be invoked for improving
the wireless security in the face of eavesdropping attacks. Existing research efforts are limited
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to the single-relay and single-jammer selection, which could be further extended to a more
general framework of multi-relay and multi-jammer selection. Additionally, typically perfect
CSI knowledge of the main and/or wiretap links is assumed in literature, which is not practical
due to the presence of CSI estimation errors. It will be of interest to investigate joint multi-relay
and multi-jammer selection in the face of imperfect CSI knowledge of the main and/or wiretap
links.
C. Location-Aware Relaying against Eavesdroppers
Having location information is crucial for determining whether or not a RN is helpful for
assisting the legitimate S-D transmission against an eavesdropper. For example, if the RN is
much closer to both S and D than to E, it would achieve significant security benefits when
employing the RN for forwarding the source signal to D. On the other hand, if the RN happens
to be located closely to E, exploiting relay aided transmission may not achieve beneficial security
improvements. This implies that the deployed network environment (e.g. the positions of RNs)
would have an impact on the SRT performance of wireless relay networks, which is to be
addressed in the future. Moreover, only the single eavesdropper is considered in this article for
performing the relay selection, but a more general wireless network may consist of multiple
eavesdroppers. Therefore, it is important to determine where the RNs should be deployed in a
certain geographic area for the sake of maximizing the wireless PLS in the presence of multiple
eavesdroppers, which is an interesting open challenge for the future.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, we studied the benefits of relay selection from a SRT perspective in wireless
networks in the presence of an eavesdropper, where multiple RNs are available for protecting
the S-D transmission against eavesdropping. We presented a pair of relay selection schemes,
namely the SRS and MRS, where the SRS only selects a single “best” RN to assist the
legitimate transmission from S to D, whereas in the MRS scheme, multiple relays are allowed
to simultaneously forward the source transmission. Numerical SRT results were provided for
characterizing the performance comparison among the DT, SRS and MRS schemes in terms
of their IP and OP. It was shown that the MRS scheme achieves the best SRT and the DT
method performs the worst. As the number of RNs increases, the SRTs of both the SRS and
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MRS schemes improve accordingly, explicitly showing the security advantage of exploiting relay
selection. Finally, we pointed out some open challenges in the field of PLS of wireless relay
networks, including the untrusted relay issues, joint multi-relay and multi-jammer selection as
well as the location-aware relaying against eavesdropping.
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Fig. 1. A wireless system consisting of a source and a destination in the presence of an eavesdropper.
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Fig. 2. A general channel model for secrecy coding based wireless communications.
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Fig. 3. IP versus OP of the classic direct transmission scheme for different secrecy rates Rs with an SNR of 15 dB, 2m = 1,
and 2w = 0:1.
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Fig. 4. A wireless network consisting of multiple relays assisting the S-D transmission in the presence of an eavesdropper.
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Fig. 5. IP versus OP of the direct transmission as well as of the SRS and MRS schemes for different secrecy rates in conjunction
with an SNR of 15dB, N = 4, 2sd = 1, 
2
si = 
2
id = 2, and 
2
se = 
2
ie = 0:2.
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Fig. 6. IP versus OP of the direct transmission as well as of the SRS and MRS schemes for different number of relays N in
conjunction with an SNR of 15 dB, Rs = 0:6 bit/s/Hz, 2sd = 1, 
2
si = 
2
id = 2, and 
2
se = 
2
ie = 0:2.
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